Watch it play outTwo-thirds of the group's value drained away in five weeks
On the day Hindenburg published, the group's listed companies were worth ₹19.19 lakh crore.
Five weeks later the group bottomed at ₹6.97 lakh crore, down 64%.
The shareholders had lost ₹12.22 lakh crore of market value, about $150 billion at the time.
Then the value came back. Earlier this year the group was worth more than ₹19 lakh crore again.
Source: Business Today; Business Standard
Three and a half years later, most of the legal threat has gone. India's Supreme Court refused to order a fresh investigation, the market regulator found the core allegations "not established", Hindenburg shut down, and two months ago a US judge dismissed the criminal charges against Gautam Adani. The balance sheet tells a different story. Net debt has nearly doubled since before the crash, leverage is rising again, and funding has moved from global bond buyers to Indian state-owned lenders. Only two of the nine listed stocks trade above their pre-report price. We convert at about ₹95 to the US dollar, close to the rate in the group's latest filings.
Watch it play outThe legal threat faded while the debt nearly doubled
Three and a half years on, most of the legal threat has gone. The balance sheet tells a different story.
Net debt has nearly doubled since before the crash, and leverage is rising again.
The share prices tell their own story. Picture the group's nine listed stocks.
Only two of the nine trade above their price on the day of the report.
What did Hindenburg actually allege about Adani?
Hindenburg, a New York short seller, accused Gautam Adani of "pulling the largest con in corporate history" and alleged "a brazen stock manipulation and accounting fraud scheme over the course of decades". It claimed that 38 Mauritius shell entities controlled by Vinod Adani, Gautam Adani's elder brother, or his associates were used to move money and prop up share prices. It also said offshore funds such as Elara held billions of dollars of Adani stock in a concentrated way that hid who really owned it.
The financial claims mattered more to investors. Hindenburg said the seven listed companies had "85% downside purely on a fundamental basis owing to sky-high valuations", that five had current ratios below 1, and that the promoters had pledged "inflated stock for loans, putting the entire group on precarious financial footing." In India, the promoter is the founding family or controlling shareholder; a pledge uses its shares as loan collateral, which can force sales if prices fall. Hindenburg was short through US-traded bonds and non-Indian derivatives.
Watch it play outHindenburg's money case: thin cushions and stretched prices
Hindenburg's financial claims covered all seven listed Adani companies.
It said five of them had current ratios below 1.
Then it took aim at the share prices themselves.
Sky-high valuations, it argued, left 85% downside on fundamentals alone.
Adani Enterprises, the flagship, pulled a fully subscribed ₹20,000 crore follow-on public offer (FPO, a share sale by a listed company) a week after the report. The group's 413-page rebuttal called the report "a calculated attack on India." Then it cut its riskiest debt: within seven weeks of the report the promoters had prepaid$2.15 billion of margin loans backed by their shares. Days after the low, GQG Partners, the US fund run by Rajiv Jain, bought about $1.87 billion of shares from the family trust.
Check the claimThree things people still get wrong about the Adani cases
What did the Supreme Court and SEBI decide?
A Supreme Court expert committee chaired by retired judge A.M. Sapre reported four months after the crash that it "cannot return a finding of regulatory failure" by SEBI, the Securities and Exchange Board of India. Almost a year after the report, the court refused to hand the probe to a special team or the CBI, India's federal police, and told SEBI to finish the last two of its 24 investigations within three months.
SEBI's decisive orders came a year ago. They dealt with the claim that money had been routed between Adani Ports, Adani Power and Adani Enterprises through three little-known companies, Adicorp, Milestone Tradelinks and Rehvar; one flow alone was ₹1,282 crore. SEBI said the allegations were "not established" and imposed no penalty: the conduits were not "related parties" under the older definition SEBI used before it widened the rules, and the loans were repaid with interest.
The rest closed last month with small settlements, without admission. Five companies paid ₹1.51 crore over related-party disclosures and audits signed without a valid peer-review certificate. In a case over whether the promoters really held more than the 75% cap, four companies and Gautam Adani settled for ₹1.48 crore, and SEBI found the allegations against Vinod Adani "not established due to lack of evidence".
One thread is open. Weeks before those settlements, Bloomberg reported that SEBI had rejected settlement offers from 13 foreign portfolio investors (FPIs, offshore funds registered to buy Indian shares), including Elara India Opportunities. SEBI hasn't confirmed this.
From crash to dismissal took three and a half years
Day 1Hindenburg reportAlleges manipulation and accounting fraud
Day 9₹20,000 crore FPO pulled
Month 12Supreme Court rulingNo new investigation team; SEBI to finish its probe
Month 22US indictmentSecurities and wire fraud counts
Month 24Hindenburg disbands
Month 32SEBI ordersFund-routing allegations not established
Month 43US charges dismissedWith prejudice; SEC settles for $18M
Month 44SEBI settlementsAbout ₹3 crore in total
What happened to the US bribery indictment?
Nearly two years ago, Brooklyn prosecutors indicted Gautam Adani, his nephew Sagar Adani and former Adani Green CEO Vneet Jaain. They alleged a scheme to pay more than $250 million in bribes to Indian officials for solar power contracts expected to earn over $2 billion in after-tax profit, hidden from US investors in Adani Green's bonds and loans. The SEC filed a parallel civil suit. Adani Green scrapped a $600 million bond, Kenya cancelled a roughly $2 billion airport deal, and TotalEnergies said it would put in no new money until the allegations were "clarified".
Then the case unwound. Hindenburg's founder Nate Anderson disbanded the firm less than two months later, citing "not one specific thing". Within weeks, President Trump paused new enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). India's law ministry twice returned the SEC's requests to serve papers on the Adanis. Earlier this year the SEC filed consent judgments, $6 million from Gautam and $12 million from Sagar, with no admission, and the Justice Department moved to drop the charges.
Two months ago, Judge Nicholas Garaufis dismissed the charges against the three with prejudice, writing that "the irregularities in the decision to dismiss the indictment are concerning". The FCPA counts against the five other defendants remain pending. Separately, Adani Enterprises booked a $275 million settlement with OFAC, the US Treasury's sanctions office, in the latest quarter.
How much debt does the Adani group have now?
Adani publishes "portfolio" figures that add up all its listed companies. At the end of the last fiscal year, gross debt was ₹3.71 lakh crore (about $39 billion). After ₹55,852 crore of cash, net debt was ₹3.15 lakh crore (about $33 billion). EBITDA for that year was ₹94,834 crore, about $10 billion. EBITDA is earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization, a rough measure of cash profit from operations.
The key ratio is net debt divided by EBITDA: roughly how many years of operating profit it would take to repay the debt, a standard gauge of leverage. In the last full year before the report it was 3.81x. After the crash the group grew earnings and held back on borrowing, and in the first full year that followed it fell to 2.19x. It has climbed ever since.
Leverage fell sharply after the crash, then rose for two years
Fiscal years. The "4 yrs ago" year ended two months after the Hindenburg report.Source: Adani Portfolio credit summaries
That low was a pause, not a new strategy. In the two years since, net debt grew 73% while EBITDA grew 14%.
Net debt grew 73% in two years while EBITDA grew 14%
Net debtEBITDA
123₹4L cr0
₹1.60L cr₹0.42L cr
5 yrs agoNet debt₹1.60L crEBITDA₹0.42L cr
₹1.87L cr₹0.57L cr
4 yrs agoNet debt₹1.87L crEBITDA₹0.57L cr
₹1.82L cr₹0.83L cr
3 yrs agoNet debt₹1.82L crEBITDA₹0.83L cr
₹2.37L cr₹0.90L cr
2 yrs agoNet debt₹2.37L crEBITDA₹0.90L cr
₹3.15L cr₹0.95L cr
Last yrNet debt₹3.15L crEBITDA₹0.95L cr
5 yrs ago4 yrs ago3 yrs ago2 yrs agoLast yr
₹ lakh crore. One lakh crore is ₹1 trillion, about $10.5 billion.Source: Adani Portfolio credit summaries
To be fair, 3.3x is not alarming for infrastructure with contracted or regulated income. Adani's deck calls 2.5x–3.5x a "benchmark", guides to 3.5x–4.5x and treats 5x as a "threshold". It says 86.55% of last year's EBITDA came from core infrastructure: utilities, ports, airports and roads. And earnings are rising: EBITDA for the latest 12 months reached ₹1,01,982 crore, with the most recent quarter up 30% year on year.
Leverage sits just under the group's own guided range
Benchmark2.50–3.50x
Guided3.50–4.50x
Low2.19x
Latest3.32x
Threshold5.00x
2345x
Source: Adani Portfolio credit summary
Who lends to Adani now?
This is the biggest change since the crash, and it gets the least attention. Global bond markets supplied 32% of group debt just after the report and 18% at the latest year-end. Domestic banks, financial institutions and NBFCs (non-bank lenders) rose from 30.9% to 48%, with state-owned banks alone at 24%.
Indian lenders replaced global bond buyers
After crashLatest
1020304050%0
31%48%
Indian banks, FIs, NBFCsAfter crash31%Latest48%
28%23%
Global banksAfter crash28%Latest23%
32%18%
Dollar bondsAfter crash32%Latest18%
5%8%
Indian bondsAfter crash5%Latest8%
4%3%
OtherAfter crash4%Latest3%
Indian banks, FIs, NBFCsGlobal banksDollar bondsIndian bondsOther
Share of gross debt. Post-crash values rounded from 30.9%, 28.1%, 32.0%, 5.1% and 4.0%.Source: Adani Portfolio credit updates
Some of this was sensible. The average cost of debt fell from 9.02% to 7.83% over the past two fiscal years, and average maturity is about seven years. Adani Ports swapped dollar bonds for a ₹5,000 crore, 15-year rupee bond at 7.75%, bought in full by LIC, India's state-owned life insurer.
But it ties the group more closely to Indian state institutions. A year ago the Washington Post reported a plan for LIC to put about $3.9 billion into Adani. LIC called the report "false, baseless and far from the truth" and said it held about ₹60,000 crore of Adani shares and under 2% of the group's debt. A group that borrows cheaply at home is less exposed to foreign investors leaving and more exposed to Indian policy.
Credit quality has improved by the rating agencies' measure. The share of run-rate EBITDA from companies rated AA- or above in India rose from 63% shortly after the crash to 92% in the latest update, and the group's deck shows S&P rating Adani Ports BBB, investment grade.
Can Adani fund its capex plan?
Adani spent ₹1,52,967 crore ($16.1 billion) of capital expenditure (capex) last fiscal year, which it calls the highest ever by an Indian company. Funds from operations (FFO), the cash left after interest and tax, were ₹67,995 crore. The gap of about ₹85,000 crore had to come from new debt or equity.
Last year's spending ran ₹85,000 crore ahead of operating cash
EBITDA₹94,834 cr
Interest paid−₹22,259 cr= ₹72,575 cr
Tax−₹4,580 cr= ₹67,995 cr
Capex−₹152,967 cr= −₹84,972 cr
Funding gap−₹84,972 cr
Funds from operations were ₹67,995 crore before capex. Ignores working capital, asset sales and acquisitions.Source: Adani Portfolio credit summary and annual results release
Equity has filled part of it. Adani Enterprises raised ₹24,930 crore in a rights issue last fiscal year and ₹15,000 crore in a qualified institutional placement (QIP, a fast share sale to institutions) a few months ago. Adani Energy Solutions raised ₹8,373 crore by QIP two years ago and another ₹3,500 crore this year. Last month Adani Airports agreed to sell about 5.5% for ₹9,825 crore to Alpha Wave, Premji Invest, Temasek and BlackRock-managed funds, valuing it at about $18 billion before the new money.
The plan ahead is bigger. The group's latest equity note sets out a $100 billion five-year investment plan and calls 66% of it "de-risked", meaning the funding sources are identified.
A third of the $100 billion plan has no named funding source
Five-year investment plan$100B
36%$36BFunds from operations
15%$15BRefinancing maturing debt
15%$15BEquity programme
34%$34BNot yet identified
The group calls the first three sources, 66% of the plan, "de-risked".Source: Adani Portfolio equity note
Where leverage lands this fiscal year comes down to how fast EBITDA grows and how much net debt is added. Last year, net debt rose ₹78,683 crore.
Another year like the last pushes leverage into the guided range
Pick this year's EBITDA growth and new net debt from last year's base
Net debt / EBITDA3.85x4.17x4.48x3.50x3.79x4.08x3.21x3.47x3.74x
+16.0%+25.6%+34.9%+5.4%+14.2%+22.9%−3.3%+4.5%+12.7%above Last yearabove Last yearabove Last yearabove Last yearabove Last yearabove Last yearbelow Last yearabove Last yearabove Last year
Last year3.32x
3.21x4.48x
Illustration only. Base: net debt ₹3,15,249 crore and EBITDA ₹94,834 crore at the last fiscal year-end. The latest 12 months already showed EBITDA 7.5% higher.
Where are returns slipping?
The warning sign isn't the debt ratio; it's what the group earns on what it builds. Adani's "return on assets", EBITDA divided by average gross assets, fell from 18.52% to 13.60% in two years. Over the same stretch, cash cover for debt servicing shrank from more than 30 months to about 17.
Spot the red flag
Tap the line you think is the tell.
Spotted it.Not that line. Gross assets rose from ₹4.83 lakh crore to ₹7.85 lakh crore. The Navi Mumbai airport, which opened late last year, and new renewable capacity add assets years before they reach full earnings.
Source: Adani Portfolio credit summaries; Yield Theory calculations
Part of the drop is timing: assets under construction earn nothing until they're finished. The test is whether return on assets climbs back as projects open. If it stays in the low teens while debt keeps rising, the ratios will get worse.
Who backed Adani after the crash?
GQG was the main outside buyer. It built stakes across the group after the crash and held through the US indictment, then sold about ₹12,077 crore of Adani stock in the latest quarter, including blocks bought by SBI Mutual Fund. Its named stakes are now around 2% of Adani Enterprises and Adani Ports, 4.3% of Adani Power and 4.5% of Adani Green across its funds.
Other foreign holders mostly stayed: Green Enterprises Investment Holding, registered in Abu Dhabi, still owns about 3% of Adani Enterprises, and Inq Holding owns 2.6% of Adani Green. TotalEnergies trimmed, selling ₹2,778 crore of Adani Green shares late last year to hold 17.25%, while keeping 37.4% of Adani Total Gas. The promoters bought in: through warrants (rights to buy shares later at a fixed price) they lifted their Adani Green stake from 56.37% to 62.43%.
Which Adani stocks have recovered since Hindenburg?
Make a guess
Spot on.Close, a little low.Close, a little high.Way off, too low.Way off, too high. It was 2.
Just two: Adani Power and Adani Ports. The headline recovery comes almost entirely from them.
Adani Power has more than tripled since the report and Adani Ports has more than doubled, both on rising profits. India's Nifty 50 index of large companies rose 24.8% over the same period. The stocks most exposed to Hindenburg's valuation argument never got back.
Only Power and Ports beat the Nifty; Total Gas is down 85%
Adani Power258.5%
Adani Ports129.9%
Nifty 5024.8%
Adani Enterprises−17.8%
Ambuja Cements−28.5%
Adani Green−30.0%
ACC−50.1%
Adani Energy Solutions−52.3%
AWL Agri Business−67.3%
Adani Total Gas−85.0%
Price change from the close on the day of the report to the latest close, excluding dividends. Adjusted for Adani Power's 1:5 split and Adani Enterprises' rights issue.
Source: NSE daily closes; Yield Theory calculations
Adani Total Gas, AWL Agri Business and ACC trade below even their post-crash lows. AWL, the former Adani Wilmar, is no longer an Adani company: the group sold out last year and Singapore's Wilmar controls it. ACC is being merged into Ambuja at 328 Ambuja shares per 100 ACC shares, approved by shareholders last month and awaiting tribunal sanction. Adani Green is still 30% below its pre-report price despite rapid capacity growth.
The total has also slipped since then. By our count of Screener.in market values, the group is worth about ₹17 lakh crore, roughly 11% below its pre-report level.
What's still unresolved?
Most cases are closed; the money questions remain
Closed
Supreme Court petition
SEBI fund-routing orders
US criminal charges against the Adanis
SEC civil suit, for $18M
OFAC settlement, $275M
vs
Still open
SEBI probe of 13 offshore funds
US FCPA counts against five others
Funding for a third of the $100B plan
Whether returns on new assets recover
Caveats: the portfolio figures are the group's own sums across listed companies, not audited consolidated accounts, and it hasn't published group debt for the latest quarter. The legal closures are settlements and dismissals, not court findings on whether Hindenburg's allegations were true.
Our read
Legally, the Hindenburg episode is mostly over. Adani paid around $18 million to the SEC and about ₹3 crore to SEBI, and no regulator or court has found the fraud alleged. That beats almost anyone's expectations in the weeks after the crash, but it isn't vindication, and the offshore-funds probe is the piece that still matters.
The balance sheet says something else. The group spent the first weeks after the crash killing the share-backed margin loans, and the following year showing it could cut leverage. Then it went back to borrowing to grow. Net debt of ₹3.15 lakh crore is close to double its level the year before the report, and leverage at 3.32x is back near pre-report levels. The debt is longer, cheaper and better rated than it was before the crash, and it comes far more from Indian state-owned banks and LIC.
We don't see a solvency problem: EBITDA is growing, most of it is regulated or contracted, and the group keeps raising equity. We do see a returns problem forming. Assets have grown four times as fast as earnings over the past two years, and a third of the next $100 billion has no named funding. If new airports, renewables and power plants lift return on assets back toward the mid-teens, leverage will look fine. If not, the next crisis will come from overbuilding, not a short seller.
For shareholders, the "recovery" is two stocks. Ports and Power earned their rebound with profits; most of the rest are below their pre-report prices. Value each company on its own cash flows, not the group's headline market value.
Go deeper
Debt and liquidity: how to read net debt/EBITDA, maturity walls and cash cover, the three numbers that decide whether Adani's ₹3.15 lakh crore is comfortable.
Capital allocation: how to judge whether a conglomerate spending ₹1.5 lakh crore a year is creating value, using the return-on-assets test from this piece.
Management incentives and the proxy: what promoter control, warrants and related-party deals mean for minority shareholders in family-run groups.
Join for member research that applies these tools to the companies behind the headlines.
Adani's net debt has reached ₹3.15 lakh crore, up 69% since the Hindenburg year, and leverage is back to 3.3x EBITDA. The legal cases have mostly closed. The balance sheet story hasn't.
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